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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the winner's curse phenomena as it was studied experimentally by 
Kagel and Levin. Experiments with the winner's curse are complicated by the fact that subjects can 
lose money and the experimenter has only a limited means of collecting it from them. Thus subjects 
enjoy only limited liability which has theoretical implications for behavior. In the Kagel and Levin 
experiments subjects were removed from the bidders' competition after losses reached a 
predetermined value. This experimental procedure has unknown implications for the results so 
ambiguity exists about whether the winner's curse was actually observed. In this study their results 
were replicated in an environment in which subjects were not removed. The case in which 
competitors are sellers is also studied. Bankruptcy cannot be a problem in sellers' competition. In 
both cases the winner's curse is observed. Thus the limited liability cannot be an explanation for the 
phenomenon reported by Kagel and Levin. In addition the paper examines the bidding behavior of 
all individuals and shows that this behavior does not fit any ofttle tested theories either on the 
aggregate or individual level. The "winner's curse" did not disappear over time during the conduct 
of the research. 
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This paper involves a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" 
which were initiated in John Kagel and Dan Levin (1984, 1986) and Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989). 
The common value auction involves firms bidding for an item of unknown common value. Since the 
value of the item is unknown, the winners can bid more than the value and thereby lose money. The 
winner's curse occurs if the winners of auctions systematically bid above the actual value of the 
objects and thereby systematically incur losses. The phenomena is said to possibly occur in the 
bidding for such natural resources as mineral rights, where the value of the mineral is unknown but 
each firm has an estimate of the value. Due to the field nature of the data, doubts have existed as to 
the actual existence of the curse. The Kagel and Levin paper tested for the existence of the 
phenomena in a laboratory setting. The hope is that by aChieving a thorough understanding of the 
phenomena as it might exist in simple laboratory environments economists will become better 
equipped to identify and study the phenomena in more complex field settings. 
Kagel and Levin report the existence of a winner's curse but their experimental procedures 
were such that there exists an alternative explanation for what they saw. The winner's curse 
involves buyers which pay more than the value of an item and therefore experience a loss. Monetary 
losses in an experiment pose somewhat of a problem because generally the experimenter has no 
means of collecting money from subjects. Subjects, knowing this, have reason to believe that the 
downside risk on their actions are truncated and thus might be prone to more risky actions than 
would be the case if they were forced to suffer full losses. In order to minimize this effect, subjects 
are frequently given a cash stake which they can lose. Kagel and Levin provided such a stake and 
required the subject to leave the experiment if and when the stake was lost. One could reasonably 
imagine that these procedures produced a "winner's curse" (Hansen and Lott, 1988). After a loss or 
two the subject's reserve could be sufficiently low that prospective losses could exceed the balance. 
Thus inflated bids ca..rry no additional risk. Furthermore, one could theorize that experience wit.l:! t.he 
curse facilitates learning and caution. According to that theory the process of removing subjects that 
were bankrupt succeeded in removing subjects less prone to the curse having had the experience of 
losing money and thereby adjusting their behavior. Thus subjects more prone to the curse would 
remain in the experiment Thus a skeptic could claim that both the existence and persistence of the 
winner's curse in the Kagel and Levin data were direct consequences of the way that the Kagel and 
Levin experimental procedures dealt with substantial losses by subjects. The technique used by 
Dyer, Kagel, and Levin is the same as that used in Kagel and Levin so similar questions might be 
raised about it as well. 
The strategy of the research reported here is to look for the phenomena using procedures 
which avoid ma.11Y of L1.C bankn..iptcy problems. Two different sets of procedures are used. First, the 
"winner's curse" experiment in which subjects might lose money was conducted simultaneously 
with a second experiment in which subjects were making money. The second set of procedures 
involved competitors as sellers in a common value auction. The winner's curse phenomena can 
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appear in this setting as the sale of an item for less than it is actually worth to the seller. The seller's 
loss occurs as an opportunity cost only so the possibility of bankruptcy does not exist. 
The experiments uSing these two different sets of experimental procedures produced several 
results which are the substance of the paper. 
1. The winner's curse was observed in both experimental settings. In essence, the Kagel and 
Levin results were replicated. 
2. Kagel and Levin's results were not a consequence of their experimental procedures. 
3. The winner's curse might diminish in size or frequency but does not completely 
dissipate over time. 
4. The winner's curse is a general phenomena exhibited by most agents. 
5. Theories of "suboptimal" behavior advanced as explanations of the phenomena do not explain 
the data as well as does the completely rational model in which the phenomena does not exist at 
all theoretically. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, Section 1, the experimental design is 
outlined. In Section 2 some competing models are discussed. Section 3 contains a statement of the 
measurement system. The results are in Section 4. The concluding section contains a discussion of 
conjectures that might advance an understanding of the phenomena. 
1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experiments were two types of common value auctions. The first type of experiment 
was the common value auction as conducted by Kagel and Levin in which buyers bid for an item of 
unknown value. Subjects agreed that if they made losses they would work them off at $10 per hour. 1 
In Experiment 1 subjects partiCipated in a sealed bid private value auction in addition to the common 
value auction in which the winner's curse might occur. In the second experiment subjects 
participated in both a common value auction in which they were buyers (Experiment 2) and also in a 
common value auction in which they were sellers (Experiment 3). (In other words, Experiments 2 
and 3 were run Simultaneously on the same subjects.) These secondary auctions constituted a 
source of funds which reduced the likelihood of bankruptcies in case the winner's curse was 
operative. These procedural changes were implemented so that subjects had full finailcialliability in 
the range of financial exposures that were likely to exist in the experiments. 
The second type of experiments (Experiments 3 through 5) were common value auctions 
with competition among sellers as opposed to buyers. The sellers tendered offers to sell an item of 
unknown value. Each seller was given one item to sell. Their option was to keep the item and 
collect its value or sell the item and collect the revenues from the sale. The person with IDe lowest 
offer sold his item and received the ask price, while everyone else kept the item and received the 
value. In this common value selling auction all subjects earned positive profits including IDe winner, 
but the winner could suffer opportunity costs by selling the item for less than IDe amount received by 
all who did not sell the actual value of the item. 
The experiments were conducted at Caltech using undergraduates as subjects. Most of the 
subjects had partiCipated in other experiments prior to these and were familiar with the experimental 
environment. The subject pool serves as a partial control for the hypothesis that the curse might be 
due to confusion about instructions. The instructions read to the subjects are attached as the 
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Appendix. Prior to the experiment, the common values of the objects were determined by 
realization from a random number table. Given the value of the object, "clues" or "signals" were 
drawn for each subject independently. Each subject was given a stack of slips of paper which 
contained the clues to the common value of the items being auctioned. The slips were stapled so that 
only the clue for the current period could be observed. The subject observed the clue and then 
submitted a bid. After the auction all bids, signals and the common value were posted. The winner 
was then announced. The subject removed the top slip to expose the clue for the next period. 
The clue was called a signal about the true value of the item to be auctioned. The value of 
the item was randomly chosen from the range (i ,x). If v was the item's value, then the signals 
were randomly chosen over an interval (v - 10 , V + E) where 10 is a positive value set by the 
experimenter. In order to avoid the winner's curse the bidder must recognize that if he wins, and 
thus buys (sells) the object, then he probably has the highest (lowest) signal, which is probably 
above (below) the item's value. Therefore in order for the person not to lose money, (forego profits) 
he must bid (ask) significantly less (more) than this signal. 
A total of five experiments were conducted. The first two were buyer markets which 
replicated one of the experimental settings of Kagel and Levin. The next three were seller markets. 
All experiments were conducted with seven subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 had the same set of 
predrawn signals and Experiments 4 and 5 had the same set of predrawn signals. The value of 10 for 
the buying auctions was $30, and it was 200 francs in the selling auctions. The range from which v 
was drawn was II ,x) = ($25, $225) for the buyer auctions and :a ,x) = (150 francs, 1,500 francs) 
for the seller auctions. (The franc values were $.0025, $.001, and $.007 for Experiments 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively.) The parameter choices reflect an attempt to unambiguously identify the curse should 
it exist. The models reviewed below suggest that the curse becomes more severe with larger 10 and a 
larger number of people. The parameters are those of Kagel and Levin's that make the curse severe. 
Another consideration was cost. In the seller auctions all subjects (except the seller) were paid the 
value of the item which makes the experiments potentially expensive. For example, if the value in 
the seller auction had been drawn from the same distribution over dollars that it was drawn from in 
the buyer auction then the cost of the experiment would have been on the order of $875 (expected 
value of v times 7) per period. The scaling factor that was chosen to reduce the cost keeps E the 
same proportion of the range ofv and also permits many periods. 
2. MODELS 
Assume that v is drawn from a uniform distribution. Assume that each Xi is drawn 
independently from a uniform distribution over the interval [v - e, v + eJ . If Xi is the signal 
observed by individual i and the structure is common knowledge, the theoretical problem is to 
model how i chooses a bid as a function of Xi' 
At least four models make sense. The first is the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of the 
associated bidding game 2. The second model is based on the hypothesis that individuals make a 
specific type of calculation error but still confonn to the generai principles of game theory. We call 
this the judgmental failure model. The third model is based on the hypothesis that people do not 
behave strategically. They only bid the expected value as if the situation was a simple second-price 
auction of a lottery and not one in which strategies might be important. The model is called the 
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naive model. The fourth model called the private value model postulates that individuals bid as if Xi 
was a private value of the object for each i. That is, individuals fail to understand the basic 
statistical relationship between value and signals. 
The optimal bidding strategy according to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model (RNNE) is to bid 
as a function of the signal (Xi). Under the buying auction the optimal strategy is 
b(Xi)=Xi -I:+Y Y = [2e1 (n + 1)] exp [ - (n 121:)(xi - (J: + 1:»] (1) 
where n is the number of subjects. 
Under the selling auction the RNNE optimal strategy is 
b(Xi)=Xi +I:-Y Y = [21:1 (n + 1)] exp [- (n I 21:)(-Xi + (x - 1:))] (2) 
Ajudgmentaljailure model (IF) is postulated by Kagel and Levin for buyer auctions. The 
model is based on the hypothesis that individuals fail to recognize that the auction winner will be the 
subject with the highest signal. The Kagel and Levinjudgmentaljailure model can be generalized to 
the seller auction. The equations for the optimal bidding strategy under the assumption that the 
bidder fails to recognize that the winner has the highest (lowest) signal are: 
buying auction b (Xi) = Xi - (2e/n) + (Y In) (3) 
selling auction b(Xi) =xi + (2e/n) - (Yin) (4) 
The above equations for t..~e R~l\.J}.ffi and JF models are only valid on the interval: .:! + e ~ Xi ::: x-c. 
The naive model (N) for both the buying auction and the selling auction has the bid simply 
equal to the signal. The bidding strategy for both types of auctions is 
b(x;) =Xi . (5) 
The [mal model, the private value model (PV), holds that indi vidual i makes the mistake of 
placing a private value xi on the object and that the private value of each of the others j is 
independently drawn from the internal Xjl: [Xi - 1:, Xi + 1:]. By applying risk neutral Nash theory to 
that situation bidding functions can be derived. For buyers the bidding function is 
(6) 
and for sellers it is 
E b (x;) = Xi + - . 
n 
3. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY 
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(7) 
The four theoretical models lend themselves naturally to a single measurement system. The 
single regression for each individual, 
eil-N(O, ai), (8) 
can be used as a measure of the accuracy of all four theoretical models. The equation can be used for 
both buying auctions and selling auctions. A summary of the restrictions on the regression equation 
imposed by the competing theories is included as Table 1. As can be seen, all theoretical models 
predict ~ = 1. The intercept term can be interpreted as 0 E where E is the value of the range of the 
signal {Xi E [v - E , V + E]} so {J( = ± I E in the RNNE; {J( = ~ E in the judgmental failure mode I ; 
n 
{J( = 0 in the naive model, and {J( = ± 1. E in the private value model. y is ± I for the RNNE; it is ± 1. 
n n 
for the JF and it is 0 for both the N and the PV. 
The measurement strategy is to first apply the unrestricted regression model. The 
coefficients can be compared to the theoretical values of the competing models. Then models with 
parameters as restricted by theory will be applied. The SSE of the unrestricted model can be used 
with the SSE of the restricted model and compute an F-statistic (Chow test) for the hypothesis that 
the restrictions are not significantly different from the unrestricted measurements. The F statistic 
will also be used as a measure of the relative closeness of the competing models. 
4. RESULTS 
·1Ue results of primary interest bear on the existence of the winner's curse. Of secondary 
interest are results that might uncover the principles that govern individual decision behavior. The 
findings are summarized by five conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 1. The winner's curse exists. 
Evidence. The per-period profit from all auctions is used as a measure. In. buying auctions 
the profit is the actual value of the object minus the purchase price of the auction winner. In. selling 
auctions the profit is the sale price of the object minus the actual price received by the winner. Thus 
in seIling auctions a negative profit is an opportunity cost incurred because the item was sold for less 
than it was worth to the seller. 
Table 2 lists the average per-period profit from all experiments. As can be seen, the winner 
makes a loss on average in four of the five experiments. The table also reports the ratio of the 
number of auctions in which a loss occurred divided by the total number of auctions. In. all cases, a 
6 
large proportion of the auctions resulted in a loss. The only possible exception to the general 
tendency is Experiment 4 which was characterized by a large number of attempts at collusion. In 
total over half of all auctions resulted in a loss. 
CONCLUSION 2. The winner's curse persists with experience but the magnitude 
and frequency of losses decline with experience. 
Evidence. The frequencies oflosses of the auction winners are divided into ten period 
quartiles for every experiment in Table 3. The average size loss is also included in the table. As can 
be seen, the proportion of auctions in which losses occur is significantly greater than zero in all 
quartiles. Even after twenty or thirty auctions, the winners lose money over 25% of the time. The 
frequency of losses decreases after the first 10 trials in all experiments except Experiment 5. 
The complete time series of profits for Experiment 5 is included as Figure 1. The figure also 
includes the profit that would have occurred if the agent had used the RNNE strategy. As can be 
seen, the winners' losses continue to occur even after thirty auctions. This experiment has a more 
severe curse than the other experiments. Unlike the other experiments the frequency does not 
decline with experience. 
The first two conclusions that have been discussed so far offer answers to the questions 
initially posed for experimental examination. The next series of conclusions reflect questions posed 
in an attempt to understand why the phenomenon occurs. As was reviewed in the section above, 
only four theoretical models have been advanced. The first question posed was whether or not any 
of these four models represent the data in a statistical sense. Since the answer turns out to be 
negative, the next series of questions attempt to identify the "best" model and ask why it fails. 
CONCLUSION 3. All four models, RNNE, JF, N, and PV, can be rejected as a statistical 
representation ofthe data. 
Evidence. Table 4 contains the results of the Chow test described in the section above. In 
all cases, the statistical model with parameters as restricted by the competing theoretical models can 
be rejected as being significantly different from the unrestricted estimates. For example, the F-
statistic for rejecting the model at a 5% confidence is 2.64 while ii'le statistic for the RNNE for 
buying auctions is 30.16, and for selling auctions it is 5.27. 
CONCLUSION 4. The RNNE is the best model of the three considered and the naive model 
is the worst. 
Evidence. The pooled data in Figure 2 show the relationship between individual signals and 
bids. The visual impression favors the RNNE model. The scattered data in the upper left of the 
figure for the seller auctions are the bids of a small number of subjects who were (evidentally) 
signaling for collusion. 
Table 5 contains the estimated coefficients from pooled data which can be compared with 
the predictiop..8 in Table 1. \Vith the exception of the Xi coefficieni. p , the standard errors tell the 
same stories as do the Chow tests discussed below. The parameter values estimated by the 
regression can be rejected as being equal to those of any of the four models. The ~ term is close to I 
but this is predicted by all models. The intercept term, ex , is closest to that predicted by the RNNE. 
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The y tenn has such a large standard error that little can be said other than the sign is in agreement 
with both the RNNE and the judgmental failure model. 
The major support for the conclusion is simply a restatement of the F statistics in Table 4. If 
the F statistic is taken as a measure of accuracy, then the RNNE is always more accurate than its 
closest competitor, the judgemental failure model. The private value model ranks third and the naive 
model is the worst. The F statistics for all models were also computed for each individual. Of the 35 
individual data sets RNNE was the best fit (lowest F statistic) for 25 and ten of these were not 
significantly different from RNNE. The JF model was best for alI of the remaining ten individuals 
but in alI cases the data were Significantly different from the JF model. 
CONCLUSION 5. Failure of the RNNE is not due to a few "irrational" people. Almost alI agents 
experienced the "curse" and bid consistent with "curse" behavior. 
Evidence. Table 6 gives the number of times that the winning bidder had the highest signal 
or the second highest signal. The game theoretic model predicts that the individual with the highest 
signal will win the auction. In each experiment over half of the auctions were won by the subject 
with the highest signal. As can be seen, decisions that resulted in winning the auction were not the 
result of some type of impulsive move by some agent with a lower signal. Nor was it the case that 
bids differed so much across subjects that the fundamental game theoretic proposition that a positive 
relationship exists between bids and signals is destroyed. In fact, the empirical result in Table 5 that 
f3 = I is strong support for that part of the theory. 
Table 7 gives the number of times each agent won the auction and the number of times each 
agent lost money as a result of winning the auction with a bid that was too high. As can be seen, the 
experience happens to most individuals. Of the 28 people who won two or more auctions, 20 of 
them lost money 50 percent of the time or more. Of the 35 subjects, only 8 never lost money. 
5. CLOSING REMARKS 
One question appears to be answered clearly. A winner's curse can be observed. A 
presumption exists about an answer to a second question. That is, it appears that the curse can 
persist over many experiences. A major puzzle remains. Of t,1-Je models studied, L':ie best is the risk 
neutral Nash equilibrium model but that model predicts that the curse will not exist. 
Part of the difficulty with further study stems from the lack of theory about the behavior of 
common value auctions with risk aversion. Closed-fonn solutions which pennit researchers to 
estimate models of "subrational" behavior have not been worlced out. If the effect of risk aversion is 
to raise the bidding function as it does in private value auctions, then risk aversion together with the 
judgmentalfai/ure model might resolve the puzzle. 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX - INSTRUCTIONS 
Instructions for buyers auctions are those that were used by Kagel and Levine and can be found in 
the Appendix to their paper. Instructions were handed out to subjects and all examples were also 
on the chalkboard. After the instructions were retrieved by the subjects they were read aloud by 
the experimenter and then the following "test" was administered. 
1. Buyer A gets a signal value of $105.00. He bids $100.00 but he is not the high bidder. His 
___ (profit/loss) is $ __ _ 
2. Buyer B gets a signal value of $75.00. She bids $60.00 and she is the high bidder. The 
value of the item is $65.50. Her ___ (profit/loss) is $ ___ . 
3. Buyer C gets a signal value of $161.00. He bids $132.00 and he is the high bidder. The 
value of the item is $131.00. His ___ (profit/loss) is $ ___ . 
4. Buyer D gets a signal value of $120.00. The value of epsilon is $30.00. Therefore, Buyer D 
knows that the value of the item is between $ and $ __ _ 
Llstnlctions for the seller auctions are as follows: 
GENERAL 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn money which will be 
paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment we will create a market in which you will act as sellers of a commodity in a 
sequence of trading periods. One unit of the commodity will be auctioned off in each trading 
period. There will be several trading periods. 
Your task is to submit written asks for the commodity. The precise value of the commodity at the 
time you make your ask will be unknown to you. Instead, each of you will receive some 
information regarding the value of the commodity which you may find useful in determining your 
ask. The process of determining the value of the commodity and the information you receive will 
be described below. 
The currency in these markets is francs. Each franc is worth $ ____ to you. 
The low ask gets the item and makes a profit equal to the ask. If you do not make the lowest ask 
on the item, you will earn the value of the commodity. 
During each trading period you will be selling in a market in which all of the other participants are 
also selling. After all asks have been handed in, all signals and asks will be posed on the 
blackboard. We will circle the low ask and post the value of the item. 
The value of the auctioned commodity (V) will be assigned randomly and will lie between 150 and 
1500 inclusively. For each auction, any value within this interval has an equally likely chance of 
being drawn. The value of the item can never be less than 150 nor more than 1500. The values V 
are determined randomly and independently from auction to auction. A high value of V in one 
period tells you nothing about the likely value in the next period. It does not even preclude the 
same value of V appearing in later periods. 
Although you do not know the precise value of the item in any particular trading period, you will 
receive information which will narrow down the range of possible values. This will consist of a 
private information signal which is selected randomly from an interval whose lower bound is V 
minus epsilon, and whose upper bound is V plus epsilon. Any value within this interval has an 
equally likely chance of being drawn and being assigned to one of you as your private information 
signal. 
Throughout this experiment, the value of epsilon is 200. 
PRIVATE INFORMATION SIGNALS 
Although you do not know the precise value of the item in any particular trading period, you will 
receive information which will narrow down the range of possible values. This will consist of a 
private information signal which is selected randomly from an interval whose lower bound is V 
minus epsilon, and whose upper bound is V plus epsilon. ANY VALUE within this interval has 
an EQUALLY LIKELY chance of being drawn and being assigned to one of you as your private 
information signal. You will always know what the value of epsilon is. 
For example, suppose that the value of the auctioned item is 762 and that epsilon is 200. Then 
each of you will receive a private information signal which will consist of a randomly drawn 
number that will be between 562 (V epsilon = 762 200) and 962 (V + epsilon = 762 + 100). 
Any number in this interval has an equally likely chance to be drawn as your signal value. 
The line diagram below shows what is going on in this example. 
EXAMPLE 
The value of the auctioned item is 762. This is the infonnation each seller received, and the asks 
each seller made: 
SELLER # SIGNAL VALUE ASK 
1 590 703 
2 756 900 
3 838 947 
4 634 778 
5 716 775 
6 847 920 
7 642 825 
In this example Seller #1 submitted the lowest bid, so he sells the item. His profit is the sale price 
703. Seller #1 received 703 while the other sellers receive the value 762. 
You will note that the value V of the auctioned item must always be between your signal value 
minus epsilon, and your signal value plus epsilon. 
Finally, you may receive a signal value below 150 or about 1500. Tbis merely indicates that the 
value V of the auctioned item is close to 150 or 1500. 
Your signal values are strictly private infonnation. DO NOT REVEAL THEM TO ANYONE 
ELSE. You are NOT to reveal your asks or profits, nor are you to speak to any other subject 
while the experiment is in progress. 
You will not be told the value of V until after all the asks have been collected and posted. 
No one may ask less than 0 for the item, nor may anyone ask more than 1700 (which is the 
maximum value of V plus epsilon). In case of ties for the low ask, we will flip a coin to decide 
who gets the item. 
Are there any questions? 
TABLE 1 - PARAMETER RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY 
COMPETING THEORETICAL MODELS 
Buying Selling 
Models 0. ~ Y 0. ~ Y 
Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium -30 1 1 200 1 -1 
Strategic Discounting -8.6 1 0.14 57.1 1 -D.14 
Naive 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Private Value -433 1 0 28.6 1 0 
Experiment 
1. (Buyer) 
2. (Buyer) 
3. (Seller) 
4. (Seller) 
5. (Seller) 
TABLE 2 
WINNERS' AVERAGE PROFIT AND LOSS FREQUENCIES 
FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS 
In Dollars (Francs) 
Average RNNE Number of Periods 
Average Profit Predicted Profit with Winners' Loss 
Per Period PerPeriod* Total Number of Periods 
-1.67 (-1.67) 11.13 (11.13) 12/20 
-3.60 (-3.60) 8.85 (8.85) 10/17 
-0.022 (-8.88) 0.196 (78.44) 8/17 
0.021 (20.91) 0.069 (69.28) 13/35 
-0.013 (-18.55) 0.050 (70.85) 25/40 
* The given RNNE equation is valid only for: ,! + E::; Xi ::; X-E. Some of the winners' signals 
were not in this range, so no predicted RNNE profit is possible. Therefore this average includes 
only periods for which the RNNE predicted profit can be calculated. 
TABLE 3 - FREQUENCY OF LOSSES FOR WINNERS IN ALL EXPERIMENTS 
Periods 1 -10 
Number of periods of loss 
Average profit per period 
Average RNNE profit per perioda 
Periods 11 - 20 
Number of periods of loss 
Average profit per period 
Average RNNE profit per perioda 
Periods 21 - 30 
Number of periods of loss 
Average profit per period 
Average RNNE profit per perioda 
Periods 31 - 40 
Number of periods of loss 
Average profit per period 
Average RNNE profit per perioda 
l. Buyers 
8/10 
-7.90 (-7.90) 
4.53 (4.53) 
4/10 
4.57 (4.57) 
18.47 (18.47) 
In Dollars (Francs) 
2. Buyers 
8/10 
-8.31 (-8.31) 
5.70 (5.70) 
2/7 
3.12 (3.12) 
13.58 (13.58) 
Experiments 
3. Sellers 
5/10 
-0.075 (-29.80) 
0.177 ( 70.96) 
3/7 
0.053 (21.00) 
0.212 (84.85) 
4. Sellers 5. Sellers 
6/10 5/10 
-0.048 (-48.20) 0.001 (1.10) 
0.060 (60.44) 0.048 (68.71) 
2/10 7/10 
0.032 (31.60) -0.016 (-22.40) 
0.048 (48.15) 0.037 (52.68) 
3/10 5/10 
0.058 (58.40) -0.004 (-6.10) 
0.104 (104.02) 0.090 (128.91) 
2/5 
0.063 (62.80) 
0.065 (65.34) 
8/10 
-0.033 (-46.80) 
0.024 (33.72) 
a The given RNNE equation is valid only for: ~ + E ::; Xi ::; X - E. Some of the winners' signals were not in this range, so no 
predicted RNNE profit is possible. Therefore this average includes only periods for which the RNNE predicted profit can be caI-
cuIated. 
Models 
RNNE 
Strategic 
Discounting 
Naive 
TABLE 4 - F-STA TISTICS FOR HYPOTHESIS THAT PREDICTIONS OF 
RESTRICTED REGRESSION ARE THE SAME AS UNRESTRICTED 
REGRESSIONS (DEGREES OF FREEDOM; 5% F VALUES) 
Buying Auctions Selling Auctions 
30.53 
(3,226; 2.64) 
133.84 
(3,226; 2.64) 
341.12 
(3,226; 2.64) 
5.93 
(3,465; 2.61) 
91.22 
(3,465; 2.61) 
160.13 
(3,465; 2.61) 
Private Value 
224.87 
(3,226; 2.64) 
122.99 
(3,465; 261) 
-22.694 
(3.156) 
TABLE 5 - ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS POOLED INDIVIDUALS 
(Standard Errors) 
Experiments 1 and 2 Experiments 3, 4, and 5 
y a 
.998 .514 341.658 .863 
(.024) (.674) (38.335) (.046) 
y 
.255 
(1.585) 
TABLE 6 
NO. OF TIMES WINNER HAD HIGHEST AND SECOND IDGHEST SIGNAL 
Experiment Highest Second Highest No. of Periods 
1. (Buyer) 14 3 20 
2. (Buyer) 9 8 17 
3. (Seller) 11 3 17 
4. (Seller) 21 8 35 
5. (Seller) 25 7 40 
TABLE 7 - NUMBER OF WINNING BIDS SUBMITTED AND 
NUMBER OF TIMES LOSSES OCCURRED: BY SUBJECT, BY EXPERIMENT 
Experiments 
1 2 3 4 5 
Subject 20 Periods 17 Periods 17 Periods 35 Periods 40 Periods 
# of winning bids 4 5 6 3 7 
# of times lost money 3 4 2 2 4 
2 # of winning bids 3 1 1 6 7 
# of times lost money 2 0 0 3 4 
3 # of winning bids 0 1 4 0 5 
# of times lost money 0 1 2 0 4 
4 # of winning bids 5 2 1 5 4 
# of times lost money 3 2 0 2 2 
5 # of winning bids 4 3 2 6 4 
# of times lost money 0 , 2 ~ 2 J 1 
"' 
6 # of winning bids 2 2 2 12 7 
# of times lost money 0 0 2 3 4 
7 # of winning bids 2 3 1 3 6 
# of times lost money 1 2 0 1 5 
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FIGURE 1 
PER PERIOD PROFIT AND RNNE PREDICTED PROFITS FOR 
EXPERIMENT 5 
35 37 39 
Period I_ Profit o RNNE Profit I 
Note: In periods 5, 11, 13,20,22,25,26,31,36, and 37 the signal is not in the interval 
[" + €:;:; xi :;:;;r + € ], which is the valid range for the given RNNE function. Therefore no 
RNNE predicted profits are shown. 
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FOOTNOTES 
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1. Only one subject made sufficient loss to be required to work. He worked about one hour to 
cover an $810ss. 
2. Obviously risk aversion is a natural extension. We have been unable to find a closed-fonn 
solution for the bidding functions. 
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